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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Within their Brief, Defendants do not dispute any of the facts 
alleged within the Plaintiffs' principal Brief1 However, Defendants' Brief 
contains additional factual allegations to which Plaintiffs respond as 
follows: 
1. Defendants allege that, during work on the Davis Hospital 
Expansion Project ("the Project"), the Plaintiff Trust Funds served a 
garnishment upon Defendant Bovis for unpaid employee benefit 
contributions that were owed by Bovis' subcontractor, Western States 
Electric ("WSE"). Defendants assert that this fact demonstrates Plaintiffs' 
knowledge of WSE's financial instability. (Brief of Appellees, page 5). 
However, this fact also demonstrates Bovis' knowledge of WSE's financial 
instability. Bovis continued to utilize WSE after receiving such notice. 
Notably, Bovis did not dispute the Trust Funds' standing to use the Utah 
garnishment statute, nor did Bovis assert that such action was preempted by 
ERISA. 
2. Defendants allege that 'the individual Plaintiffs have been paid 
all of their actual wages for their work on the Project." (Brief of Appellees, 
1
 In an effort to achieve clarity and conciseness, the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
ERISA Trust Funds, Union and NECA Funds are collectively referred to 
herein as "Plaintiffs," and the Defendants/Appellees Bovis, Travelers and 
Davis Hospital are collectively referred to as "Defendants." 
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page 15). This is true. However, the individual Plaintiffs have not received 
the value of their services rendered, within the meaning of the Utah 
Mechanic's Lien Statute, because they have not received the benefit fund 
contributions that were a substantial part of their compensation for such 
services. 
3. Appellees' Brief states at page 20: 
Appellants reference cases in which various iterations of trust 
or benefit funds have been allowed to claim as assignees but, in 
all of those cases, the workers were not themselves the 
claimants. Indeed, Appellants are making a claim and seeking 
benefit for "other industry employees" wholly unconnected 
with the Project. Whatever the legal arguments for an abstract 
right of employees to assign their claims, the fact is that they 
have not done so in this case.2 
This passage raises a number of vague assertions that are potentially 
misleading. First, Defendants cite no authority and provide no rationale for 
their implied assertion that joining the individual workers as Plaintiffs in this 
case should prejudice the claims of the institutional Plaintiffs as assignees of 
the individual workers. Plaintiffs may state their claims in the alternative 
under Utah.R.Civ.Proc. 8. 
Second, only the Plaintiff NECA Funds represent the interests of the 
electricians' industry in general. The ERISA Trust Funds seek to recover 
Defendants cite no evidence from the record in support of these assertions. 
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benefit contributions on behalf of the individual workers. The Union 
Plaintiffs seek to recover working assessments for the benefit of the Union, 
of which the individual workers are members. Moreover, the individual 
workers, as members of the Union and workers within the electricians' 
industry, benefit from the actions of the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA 
Funds. Defendants acknowledged within their Summary Judgment 
Response, at page 6, that "the NECA Funds may provide some benefit to the 
individual Plaintiffs." (R. 789). It is undisputed that contributions to the 
Union Plaintiffs and NECA Funds were part of the value of the services 
rendered by the individual Plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR 
CLAIMS UNDER THE UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN ACT. 
Defendants' Brief argues at length that Plaintiffs lack standing under 
the Utah Mechanics' Lien Act, Utah Code Section 38-1-1 et seq, because 
Plaintiffs did not supply any labor or materials to the Project. (Brief of 
Appellees, pages 7-21). This argument fundamentally misconstrues the 
nature of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs do not, and have never, asserted that 
they have standing to sue under the Mechanics' Lien Act in their own right. 
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Plaintiffs have continually asserted that they have standing under the Act 
only in the capacity as assignees of the individual Plaintiffs, under the 
authority of United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957), and its numerous 
progeny. 
Defendants have never disputed that the institutional Plaintiffs 
effectively stand as assignees of the individual Plaintiffs under U.S. v. 
Carter, nor have Defendants ever discussed whether Plaintiffs have standing 
to sue in that capacity. Instead, Defendants erroneously present the issue in 
this case as a question of who has standing to sue under the Utah Mechanic's 
Lien Act. That is not the issue. There is no dispute that the individual 
Plaintiffs have standing under the Act. They provided essential services 
directly to the Project. Such services were not "peripheral" or unforeseen by 
the property owner. The institutional Plaintiffs are merely the assignees of 
the individual Plaintiffs in relation to certain portions of their compensation. 
As recognized by U.S. v. Carter, the reality of modern employment is that a 
substantial amount of the compensation paid to workers is provided in the 
form of benefits, which are often supplied by third parties, such as insurers 
and retirement funds. The issue in the present case is not who has standing, 
but rather, what compensation is recoverable as part of the value of the 
4 
services rendered by workers who are undeniably within the purview of the 
Act. 
The remedy provided under the Utah Mechanics' Lien Act is not 
limited to wages, as Defendants imply, but rather to the "value of the 
services rendered/' Under any reasonable construction of that phrase, the 
"value of the services rendered" must include the benefits that are provided 
to the workers in compensation for their services. Defendants have never 
contended otherwise. 
The vast majority of courts that have considered the issue have 
allowed employee benefit funds to enforce mechanic's liens to collect 
contributions owed for work done by their participants. Defendants' Brief 
attempts to distinguish two of these cases (Brief of Appellees, pages 19-20), 
and simply disregards all of the others. Defendants do not deny that the 
clear weight of authority allows the relief requested by Plaintiffs in the 
present case. 
3
 See National Electrical Industry Fund, et al. v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 463 A.2d 858 (Md. App. 1983); Connecticut Carpenters Benefit 
Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners, 849 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. 2004); 
Performance Funding, L.L.C. v. Arizona Pipe Trade Trust Funds, 49 P.3d 
293 (Ariz. App. 2002); Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's 
Hospital, 642 N.W. 2d 849 (Neb. App. 2002); Hawaii Laborers' Trust Funds 
v. Maui Prince Hotel, 918 P.2d 1143 (Hawaii 1996); Plumber's Local 458 v. 
Howard Immel, Inc., 445 Nw.2d 43 (Wise. App. 1989); Divane v. Smith. 
774 N.E. 2d 361(111. App. 2002). 
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Defendants rely upon cases from the two states that have denied such 
relief.4 (Brief of Appellees, pages 11-13). However, in these states, the 
courts did not consider the question of whether the benefit funds had 
standing as assignees of the individual workers. Further, in both of these 
states, the benefit funds have been afforded an equivalent remedy under the 
contractors' bond statutes.5 
Defendants' Brief discusses several Utah Court decisions under the 
Mechanics' Lien Act (Brief of Appellees, pages 7-11), all of which are 
fundamentally distinguishable from the present case. This case does not 
involve a question as to whether a particular type of service, such as leasing 
or transporting equipment, is lienable under the Act. The work performed 
by the individual Plaintiffs is clearly lienable under the Act. Further, the Act 
is to be liberally construed in favor of the individual Plaintiffs who 
4
 See Ridge Erection v. Mountain States T. & T., 549 P.2d 408 (Colo. App. 
1976); Edwards v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 517 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. App. 1988). 
5
 Trustees of Colo. Carp, v. Pinkard Construction. Co., 604 P.2d 683 (Colo. 
1979); Indiana Carpenters v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 601 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. App. 
1992). Defendants also rely upon Chestnut-Adams v. Bricklayers and 
Masons Trust Funds, 612 N.E.2d 236 (Mass. 1993). (Brief of Appellees, 
page 9 note 2). However, the decision in Chestnut Adams was based upon 
ERISA preemption, and the Court relied primarily upon the previous 
decision of the California Supreme Court in Carpenters v. El Capitan, 811 
P.2d 296 (Cal. 1991). However, El Capitan was effectively overruled by 
the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in So. Cal. IBEW-NECA 
Trust Funds v. Standard Industrial Co., 247 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2001). 
6 
performed such work. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development, 714 
P.2d 289 (Utah 1986). The institutional Plaintiffs only appear in this case 
because, as a practical matter, some of the compensation due to the 
individual Plaintiffs was to be provided indirectly by their employer through 
third parties. The issue in the present case is whether workers may recover 
compensation which is clearly part of "the value of the services rendered," 
but which is provided by third parties other than the employer. The Utah 
Courts have not ruled on this issue. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE THEIR 
CLAIMS UNDER THE UTAH PAYMENT BOND 
STATUTE. 
Defendants' Brief extensively criticizes the authorities cited by 
Plaintiffs in support of their claim under the Utah Payment Bond Statute.6 
However, Defendants cite no authority whatsoever, not even a single case, in 
which an ERISA Fund has been denied standing to collect delinquent 
6
 Defendants' Brief takes Plaintiffs to task for referring to the relevant 
statute, Utah Code Section 14-2-1 et. seq., as the "Utah Payment Bond 
Statute." (Brief of Appellees, page 22). However, Section 14-1-1 et. seq. 
was repeatedly referred to as "the Payment Bond Statute" by the Utah 
Supreme Court in John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules. 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah 
1990), and by the Utah Court of Appeals in Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. 
Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C.. 57 P.3d 241 (Utah App. 2002). 
7 
employer contributions under a payment bond. Conversely, numerous cases 
have allowed such recovery. 
Even those states that deny recovery to ERISA Funds under their 
o 
mechanic's lien statutes permit recovery under their bond statutes. This is 
due, in part, to the fact that mechanic's liens provide a remedy which may 
conflict with the rights of property owners, whereas payment bond statutes 
provide a remedy against sureties that have been compensated for assuming 
the risk. Indiana Carpenters, 601 N.E. 2d at 356. 
Defendants suggest that a relevant distinction exists between private 
contractor's bond statutes and public contractor's bond statutes. (Brief of 
Appellees, pages 22-34). However, Defendants provide no authority in 
support of this assertion. The only case cited by Defendants on this point, 
Indiana Carpenters, contains nothing which supports such a distinction. 
7
 United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957); Ragan v. Tri-Countv 
Excavating, 62 F.3d 501 (3rd Cir. 1995); So. Cal. IBEW-NECA Trust Funds 
v. Standard Industrial Co., 247 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2001); Trustees of Colo. 
Carp, v. Pinkard Construction. Co., 604 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1979); United 
States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Arizona State Carpenters, 584 P.2d 60 (Ariz. 
App. 1978); Indiana Carpenters v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 601 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. 
App. 1992); Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's Hospital, 642 
N.W. 2d 849 (Neb. App. 2002); Divane v. Smith, 774 N.E. 2d 361 (111. App. 
2002). 
See cases cited notes 4 and 5, supra. 
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Conversely, the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs include both public and 
private payment bonds. (See cases cited at note 7, supra). 
Defendants further suggest that Utah case law supports a relevant 
distinction between public and private bond statutes, stating "Utah law is 
clear that interpretations of the private contractor bond statute are not guided 
by similarity to the public contractors bond statute, but rather by similarity to 
the mechanic's lien statute." (Brief of Appellees, page 23). 
Although the Utah Courts have noted similarities in the language and 
purpose of the Mechanic's Lien Act and the private bond statute, Defendants 
cite no authority indicating a relevant distinction between those statutes and 
the public bond statutes. To the contrary, the Utah Courts have repeatedly 
noted the similarity between the Mechanic's Lien Act and the public bond 
statutes. Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 504 
(Utah 1990); Johnson v. Gallegos Construction Co., 785 P.2d 1109, 1111 
(Utah 1990). Therefore, the distinction urged by Defendants simply does not 
exist under Utah law. Moreover, Defendants provide no rationale as to why 
public and private bond statutes should be treated differently. Defendants 
apparently concede that Plaintiffs would have standing to enforce a public 
bond, and provide no basis for distinguishing an action based on a private 
bond. 
9 
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT PREEMPTED BY ERISA. 
The scope of preemption under 29 U.S.C. Section 1144(a) of ERISA 
was substantially limited by the United States Supreme Court in New York 
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645 (1995). Defendants erroneously state that Travelers did not 
limit, but merely clarified, the scope of preemption. (Brief of Appellees, 
pages 36-39). However, Defendants cite no authority in support of this 
assertion. Defendants merely quote a passage from Travelers stating that 
ERISA preemption is not limited to laws that directly regulate ERISA plans. 
(Brief of Appellees, page 38). 
Travelers established a presumption that state laws are not preempted 
by ERISA. 514 U.S. at 654. Under Travelers, state laws are preempted by 
ERISA only where Congress has expressed a "clear and manifest purpose" 
to preempt such laws. Id. Travelers established that state laws of general 
application are not preempted by ERISA. Id at 655. Travelers has generally 
been construed in subsequent cases as substantially limiting the scope of 
ERISA preemption. WillmarElec. Serv. V. Cooke, 212 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 
2000); So. Cal. IBEW-NECA Trust Funds v. Standard Industrial Co., 247 
F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2001). 
10 
In Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995), 
the Utah Supreme Court applied Travelers and subsequent case precedents 
in determining that a claim for legal malpractice was not preempted by 
ERISA. The Harmon City Court summarized the scope of preemption as 
follows: 
As the Tenth Circuit has recognized, there are four categories of laws 
which have been held to be preempted because they "relate to" 
ERISA plans: 'First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms 
of ERISA plans. Second, laws that create reporting, disclosure, 
funding, or vesting requirements for ERISA plans. Third, laws that 
provide rules for the calculation of the amount of benefits to be paid 
under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules that provide 
remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the 
ERISA plan. 
The Tenth Circuit has further summarized the type of state law claims 
which fall on either side of preemption: 'Laws that have been ruled 
preempted are those that provide an alternative cause of action to 
employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA, refer specifically to 
ERISA plans and apply solely to them, or interfere with the 
calculation of benefits owed to an employee. Those that have not 
been preempted are laws of general application—often traditional 
exercises of state power or regulatory authority—whose effect on 
ERISA plans is incidental.' 907 P.2d at 1168. (emphasis added). 
The Harmon City Court further stated that a law is more likely to be 
preempted when it governs the relationship between ERISA entities—the 
employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and the participants and 
beneficiaries—than when it affects the relationship between one of these 
11 
entities and an outside party. 907 P.2d at 1169. Finally, the Harmon City 
Court observed that preemption is not applied where the state law at issue 
governs an area of law traditionally left to the states. Id. 
The factors identified in Harmon City all militate against preemption 
in the present case. Plaintiffs' claims do not regulate the type of benefits or 
terms of ERISA plans; they do not create reporting, disclosure, funding, or 
vesting requirements for ERISA plans; they do not provide rules for the 
calculation of the amount of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans; and they 
do not provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of 
the ERISA plan. Plaintiffs' claims are based upon state statutes of general 
application relating to an area of law that is traditionally left to the states. 
Plaintiffs only seek to enforce the same rights as any other lawful assignee 
of a mechanic's lien or bond claim. In fact, to deny Plaintiffs their requested 
remedy would discriminate against ERISA plans without any basis in law or 
equity. 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims are preempted because they 
seek an "alternative remedy" which is one of the recognized bases for 
ERISA preemption. However, as Harmon City makes clear, the type of 
"alternative remedy" that provides a basis for preemption is one that is 
asserted against ERISA plans to collect benefits. See also Monarch Cement 
12 
Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc. 982 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1992); 
Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. Of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 
752. ERISA does not preempt alternative remedies that are used by ERISA 
plans to collect contributions from third parties who are not subject to the 
ERISA statutory framework. See Bellemead Dev. V. NJ. Council, Carp. 
Ben Funds, 11 F.Supp.2d 500, 515 (D.N.J. 1998); I.B.E.W. v. Oregon Steel 
Mills, Inc., 5 P.3d 1122, 1130 (Ore. App. 2000). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, Plaintiffs 
request that the decision of the District Court in this case be reversed, and 
that this case be remanded to the District Court with a direction to enter 
partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issue of their standing 
under the Utah Mechanics Lien Act and Payment Bond Statute, and the issue 
of ERISA preemption. 
Respectfully submitted this I day of October, 2007. 
Richard W. PerkinsL^7 
Kenneth B. Grimes 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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